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Abstract- In games such as the war of attrition and
parental care games the length of time spent in a
realisation of the game is dependent on the strategy
used. Hence, there is a trade off between the mean
reward obtained per realisation of the game and the
mean number of games played per unit time. Such a
game should not be modelled using the standard two-
player form, but should be defined as a game against
the field (a large population game). In parental care
games, such an approach also enables us to define a
more consistent model, which takes into account, for
example, the obvious fact that each individual has one
parent of both sexes and that the ease with which a
male deserter can find a new partner depends on the
strategy profile used in the population. If the mortality
rate is independent of strategy, then each individual
should simply maximise the rate of producing offspring.
However, if mortality rates depend on strategy, then at
equilibrium an individual should maximise the number
of offspring produced during their lifetime. This paper
considers pure equilibria in a parental care game, in
which the mortality rate depends on an individual's
strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many classical models in the field of evolutionary
game theory (see Maynard Smith [1]) an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) is defined as a refinement of
a Nash equilibrium in an appropriately defined two-
player game. The following are implicit assumptions
in such a formulation:
i) Each individual in the population plays the
same number of realisations of the game.
ii) The opponent in each realisation of the game
is chosen at random from the population as
a whole.
However, these assumptions may often be unreason-
able. For example, in the war of attrition (see Maynard
Smith and Price [2]) each player chooses a waiting
time. Those who choose longer waiting times will on
average spend more time in a realisation of the game.
It is expected that such individuals will play the game
less frequently than those who choose shorter waiting
times. Hence, there will be a tradeoff between the
mean reward obtained from a realisation of the game
and the rate at which games are played. Also, it may
be reasonable to assume that the opponent in a game
should be chosen from the set of individuals who are
at present not involved in such an interaction. In this
case the choice of opponent should be biased towards
individuals with shorter waiting times. Cannings and
Whittaker [3] and Eriksson et ale [4] consider models
of the war of attrition in which these effects are taken
into account.
Such tradeoffs also arise in parental care games. In
simple terms, deserters may be able to breed more
often than carers, but the mean number of offspring
surviving from each breeding attempt will be less than
the mean number of offspring raised per breeding
attempt by carers.
Maynard Smith [5] considered three different mod-
els of parental care. The first two models were defined
as standard two-player games. However, he was aware
that such models are inappropriate as the payoff of
e.g. a deserting male depends on the availability of
females, which in turn depends on the strategies used
within the population as a whole. Hence, he proposed
a third model in which the payoffs of an individual are
dependent on the strategies used within the population
as a whole. He could not, however, find an analytic
solution to such a game.
Houston and McNamara [6] consider the problems
involved in developing a good model for a parental
care game. They state that although it is necessary
when defining a model to consider some aspects in
isolation from others, this leads to a distorted picture
when there is clear feedback between two factors.
For example, the operational sex ratio (OSR, the
ratio of the number of males searching for a mate
to the number of females searching for a mate) is
a key factor in such models. However, the OSR is
obviously dependent on the strategies employed. The
more females care for their young, the higher the
OSR. Hence, a model cannot define a value for the
OSR without referring to the strategies used within
the population. Also, to be self-consistent a model of
parental care must take into account the fact that the
total number of offspring of males is equal to the total
number of offspring of females.
This paper considers a model of a parental care
game adapted from Ramsey [7]. The model presented
here assumes that there is no breeding season. It is in
some ways an extension of Yamamura and Tsuji's [8]
model. This model was adapted to the life history of St.
Peter's Fish by Balshine-Earn and Earn [9]. In these
two models individuals of the rarer sex in the pool
of searchers immediately find a mate. However, in the
model presented here such individuals find mates at an
appropriately faster rate than individuals of the more
common sex in the pool of searchers. Similar models
have been considered for species that breed seasonally,
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but several breeding attempts are possible in a season
(see Webb et al. [10], McNamara et al. [11]).
II. THE MODEL
It is assumed that there is no breeding season and in-
dividuals do not form lasting partnerships. Individuals
play one of two strategies: care or desert. Carers will
produce a greater number of offspring per breeding
attempt, but will breed less often than deserters. The
rate at which an individual finds mates depends on
the proportions of individuals of each sex who care or
desert. These proportions are referred to as the strategy
profile. A pure strategy profile satisfies the following:
all males use the same strategy and all females follow
the same strategy.
Males may be in one of two states: searching or
breeding. Females may be in one of three states:
receptive, non-receptive or breeding. For simplicity, it
is assumed that when individuals are in the breeding
state they do not attempt to breed with other partners.
It is assumed that the rate at which juvenile males
join the adult population is rm times the rate at which
juvenile females join the adult population. This ratio
depends on the sex ratio at birth, the age of maturation
and the mortality rates of juveniles and is assumed to
be fixed for a given species. It is assumed that on
maturing individuals enter the searching or receptive
state, as appropriate to sex. An individual inherits the
strategy used by the parent of the same sex. Denote
the equilibrium proportions of males in the two states,
searching and breeding, as PI and P2 respectively.
The proportions of females in the three female states:
receptive, non-receptive and breeding, are denoted ql,
q2 and q3, respectively. These proportions depend on
the strategy profile adopted within the population, but
unless we are considering a particular strategy profile,
this dependence will not be made apparent by the
notation. When we are considering a particular pure
strategy profile, the strategy profile will be denoted
by a double index. The first and second letters define
the strategies used by males and females, respectively.
Hence, pfc denotes the equilibrium proportion of
males that are searching when males desert and fe-
males care. The ratio of the number of adult males
to the number of adult females is denoted ro. This
will in general differ from rm due to the variable
mortality rates (see below). Also, ro depends on the
strategy profile used. Hence, when we consider a
specific strategy profile, this will be reflected by adding
the appropriate superscript to ro.
Males in the searching state find a mate at a rate pro-
portional to the number of receptive females, namely
at rate Alql. Similarly, receptive females find a mate at
a rate proportional to the number of searching males,
namely at rate AIPI ro. It should be noted that these
assumptions satisfy the condition that the number of
males entering the breeding state equals the number of
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females entering the breeding state. Receptive females
become unreceptive at rate PI, i.e. the mean length
of the receptive period is ...!... Unreceptive females
PI
become receptive at rate P2. It is assumed that the
parameters PI and P2 are fixed according to the phys-
iological processes in a species. Given a female does
not mate, she will be receptive for a proportion ----'!:L-+2
PI P2
of the time. By letting P2 ---+ 00, we obtain a model in
which non-breeding females are always receptive.
The rates at which breeding males rejoin the pool
of searching males depends on whether they care for
their offspring or not. Deserting males return to the
pool of searching males at rate A~. That is to say that
on average the mating process and time to replenish
sperm supplies occupies ,Ab units of time. Similarly,
if females do not care for their young, they return to
the pool of receptive females at rate Af. For example,
in mammals A~ tends to be much larger than Af, i.e.
male deserters can return to searching for a new mate
much faster than female deserters. When they care for
their young, males and females return to the pool of
individuals searching for a mate at rates A~ and A7,
respectively. It is assumed that A~ ~ A7.
The mortality rates of searching males and non-
breeding females are assumed to be J.,tm and J.,tf'
respectively. In the breeding state, the mortality rates
of male and female deserters are assumed to be J.,t~ and
J.,tf, respectively. The mortality rate of a carer depends
on the strategy used by the partner. If the partner
also cares, the mortality rates are J.,t~c and J.,t7c , as
appropriate. If the partner defects, the corresponding
mortality rates are J.,t~D and J.,t7D.
The number of offspring that survive until maturity
is measured relative to the number surviving when no
parental care is given. It should be noted that a parent
may die whilst caring for young. Hence, for simplicity
it is assumed that the number of surviving young
depends on the number of caring parents alive at the
end of the period of care. However, the mortality rates
only depend on the strategies adopted by the parents at
the beginning of the period of care. Also, it is assumed
that if an individual cares then it continues caring when
a partner dies. Define the relative numbers of young
surviving to maturity when a) just the female cares, b)
just the male cares and c) both parents care to be kDc,
kCD and kcc, respectively. It is assumed that these
values are independent of the strategy profile used
within the population. This is a reasonable assumption
if the carrying capacity of the environment is indepen-
dent of the strategy profile used. At equilibrium the
rate at which individuals mature must be equal to the
rate at adult individuals die. This rate will be denoted
k. This rate depends on the strategy profile used and
when a specific profile is under consideration this will
be specified using the appropriate pair of indices as
above. A proportion r:+'l of these surviving offspring
equal the sex ratio among those dying. This leads to
r
m
= rO[PIJLm + (1 - Pl)JL~] . (6)
(ql + q2)ILI + q3ILj
In addition, we must have
(7)ql + q2 + q3 = 1.
Plql
P2 + ILl
1 _ ql (PI + P2 + ILl)
P2 + ILl
A:n + IL-:n
q2
q3
ro
PI
B. Deriving the ESS Conditions
Here, we derive the conditions for biparental care
to be an ESS. The derivation of the conditions for the
other three possible pure strategy profiles to be an ESS
are analogous and hence we just give the conditions.
In order for biparental care to be an ESS, when
all the population care for their offspring the expected
number of surviving offspring of the same sex pro-
duced by a mutant who deserts must be less than one.
First, we consider the expected number of surviving
male offspring of a male mutant. Let mfc be the
expected number of future surviving male offspring of
a mutant male in state i when both sexes care. From
the assumptions of the model, mfc is the expected
Al ql + A~ + IL-:n
(rm + 1) [PI (Alql + ILm + A:n) - A:n]
AlPlqlrm
rm[(ql + q2)ILI + q3ILj]
PllLm + (1 - Pl)lL-:n .
For example, to calculate the equilibrium propor-
tions, sex ratio ro and maturation rate when males
desert and females care, we set A:n = A~, Aj = A7,
11.* = II.D and 11.* = II.CD
r'm r'm r'1 r'1 .
For a given strategy profile, we need to calculate
PI, ql, q2, q3, ro and k. Since each male entering the
breeding state must correspond to a female entering
the breeding state, one of the equations given above is
redundant. Equations (1 )-(7) can be rearranged to give
aqr + bql + C = 0, where
PlP2
a = ILl + PI - +
P2 + ILl
+ PI +P2+ILI [(l-rm)JL* +,\e _ '\~(JLj+,\j)]
rm(P2 +ILl) I I A~ + IL-:n
b = JL* +JLj+'\j [ILm(Pl+P2+1L1) + A:n -1]
I rmAl (P2 + ILl) A~+IL-:n
ILm (IL j + Aj )
C =
Alrm
Once the appropriate value of ql has been calculated
(when a > °it is simple to show that there is only
one root in [0,1]), we can calculate q2, q3, PI, k and
ro using
Also, the sex ratio among maturing juveniles must
A. Calculation of the Equilibrium Proportions
In order to investigate pure ESSs of such a game,
we must first derive the equilibrium proportions of
individuals in each state when each member of the
population follows a given strategy appropriate to its
sex, together with the number of offspring of each
sex that survive to maturity per breeding attempt. Let
kDD , kCD, kDc and kcc be the expected number
of offspring surviving to maturity at equilibrium when
there is no parental care, just males care, just females
care and both parents care, respectively. Unless a
specific strategy profile is under consideration, the
index will be omitted. The general form of the model is
illustrated in Fig. 1. The rates given are the appropriate
population rates.
Given the strategy profile is fixed, at equilibrium the
population rate of entering into a state must be equal
to the population rate of exiting that state. Considering
the two male states, we obtain
• AlPlqlkrm
PI (Alql +ILm) = Am (I-PI) + 1 (1)
rm +
(1 - Pl)(A:n + IL~) = AlPlql, (2)
are male.
We should differentiate between the rates at which
individuals pass between states and the relative rates
at which transitions occur between states within the
population of individuals of a particular sex (the pop-
ulation rate). Such population rates are obtained by
multiplying the proportion of individuals of a given sex
in a particular starting state by the rate at which such
an individual moves to another state. For example,
since males are searching for a mate a proportion PI
of the time and each find mates at rate Alql, the rate
at which males breed in the population as a whole is
AlPl ql. Thus, the rate at which males mature in the
population as a whole is Al~::~~r",. Arguing similarly,
the rate at which females mature in the population as
a whole is Al~~~~ok. It is assumed that the population
is at equilibrium, i.e. infants are born at a steady rate
within the population as a whole. Hence, we may
assume that the offspring "immediately" mature at a
steady rate within the population as a whole.
where • represents C or D according to whether
a given sex cares for their offspring or not and *
represents D, CD or CC as appropriate given the
strategies used by two parents.
Considering the three female states in turn
• AlPlqlrok
ql (ILl +AlPl ro +PI )=q2P2 +q3A1+ 1 (3)
rm +
q2(P2 + ILl )=qlPl (4)
q3(ILj + Aj)=AlPlqlro. (5)
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PIJ-Lm q2J-Lf
Dead
qlJ-Lf
Males P2J-L-:n q3J-Lj Females
qlPl
Searching I---- ......- Receptive Non-Receptive
q2P2
APlq1krrn p2-X:n -X1Plql -X1Plqlro q3-Xj APlql rokrrn+1 rrn+ 1
Male Female
(9)
Breeding
Offspring
Fig. 1: Transition rates between states.
number of surviving male offspring a mutant male
produces during his lifetime. In State 1, no offspring
are produced and a male survives to find a mate with
. . AlqfCprobabIlIty A ee+ . Hence,
1 ql J-lrn
(8)
In order to calculate the relative number of offspring
such a male obtains per breeding attempt in compari-
son to the population as a whole, we must consider the
pattern of mortality. First, we consider the population
as a whole. When both parents care the probability
of a) both parents surviving, sfC, b) just the male
surviving, s~C, c) just the female surviving, s7c and
d) neither parent surviving, sf{c are given by
(-xg + J-LgC)(-X7 + J-L7C)
J-L7cJ-L~c
It follows that the relative number of surviving off-
spring per breeding attempt compared to the situation
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where there is no parental care is given by kcc, where
-X~-X7kcc+J-L~c-X7kDC+J-L7c-X~ckcD+J-L7cJ-L~c
kcc (-xg + J-LgC)(-X7 + J-L7C)
Now consider a breeding attempt by a male mu-
tant. The number of surviving offspring depends only
on whether the mother survives the period of care.
Considering the mother's probability of survival, the
relative number of surviving offspring compared to the
number surviving when no parental care is given by
kDc, where
- -X7kDC + J-L7D
kDc = -XC + CDf J-Lf
Hence, the mean number of survivin8,. offspring per
breeding attempt by a male mutant is kDkckcc.
cc
In state 2, a desertin~male survives to return to state
1 with probability ADA+rn D • It follows that
rn J-l rn
D CC --
-Xmm1 rmkDckcc
----+------X~ + J-L~ (rm + l)kcc
Solving the set of linear equations for mfc and mrjC
given by (8) and (9), we obtain
cc - - D D
mfc= Alql rmkDckcc{Am + J-Lm)
kcc(rm+l)(-XlqfcJ-L~ +J-Lm-X~ +J-LmJ-L~)·(10)
Now we consider a female mutant. Define
ffc, ffc and ffc to be the expected number of
ADD
B DD
III. EXAMPLES
These conditions can be used to show how the set of
ESSs depends on the benefits of parental care. Assume
that PI = P2 = 1, Af = A~ = 0.05, Af = 0.2,
A~ = 5, Al = 20, rm = 1, J-Lm = J-Lf = J-L-:n = J-Lj =
0.01, where * E {D,CD,CC}. The parameters are
chosen to reflect the physiological constraints observed
in mammals and birds (i.e. deserting males can return
to mating much quicker than females). The mortality
rate is assumed to be independent of sex, state and
strategy. Since the incoming sex ratio is one, the ratio
of the number of adult males to the number of adult
females will be one.
1. No parental care is an ESS when kCD <
5.0612 and kDc < 3.9360.
2. Just female care is an ESS when kDc >
3.9379 and kDc > 0.5054kcc - 0.2202.
3. Just male care is an ESS when kCD >
59.3854 and kCD > 0.5986kcc - 0.2239.
4. Biparental care is an ESS when
kcc > 13.6473kDc + 2.7695 and
kcc > 3.8527kcD + 0.8105.
The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained
for the model presented by Ramsey [7], in which
the mortality rate was not taken into account and
individuals maximise their reproduction rate. For the
parameters considered (based on the physiology of
mammals), if uniparental care should evolve, then it
is expected that female care will evolve.
Since in the model considered here mortality does
not depend on the strategy used, it might be expected
that individuals should simply maximise their expected
- DD - C CDDD kCDAlql rmkDD(Am + J-Lm )
m l = (rm+I)[AlqpDJ-LgD+J-LmAg+J-LmJ-LgD]·
The mean number of surviving female offspring of a
female mutant is given by fpD = ADD/BDD , where
- DD DD- C CDkDcAlPl ro kDD(Af +J-Lf )(P2+J-Lf)
(rm + 1) [AlpfDrfDJ-L f D(p2 + J-Lf) +
+J-Lf(Pl + P2 + J-Lf )(J-LfD + Af)]·
No parental care is an ESS when both fpD < 1 and
mfD < 1.
The mean number of surviving female offspring of a
female mutant is given by ffD = AcD/BcD , where
- CD CD- C CCACD kCCAlPl ro kCD(Af + J-Lf )(P2 + J-Lf)
BCD = kCD(rm + 1) [AlpfDr fDJ-L f C(p2 + J-Lf) +
+J-Lf(Af + J-LfC) (PI + P2 + J-Lf )].
Male care is an ESS when both ffD < 1 and mfD <
1.
Suppose no-one cares for offspring. The mean num-
ber of surviving male offspring of a male mutant is
given by
(13)
(12)
Acc
Bcc
Similarly, considering the probability
from state 2 to state 1, we obtain
f cc _ P2ff
C
2 -
P2 + J-Lf
In state 3, arguing as in the case of a male mutant, on
average kc(kC12 ) females are produced who survive
kee rrn+ l
to adulthood, where
ACk CDk - m CD+J-Lm
CD - AC + CD
m J-Lm
The probability that a female deserter survives to
AD
return to State 1 is ~+f . It follows that
f J-lf
- - D CC
f cc _ kcckcD + Af fl3 - D D·kcc(rm+I) Af +J-Lf
Equations (11) - (13) can be rearranged to find ffc,
which from the assumptions is the expected number of
surviving female offspring a mutant female produces
in her lifetime. We obtain ffc = Acc / Bcc, where
cc CC- - D DAlPl ro kcckcD(Af +J-Lf)(P2+J-Lf)
kcc(rm + 1)[AlpfcrfcJ-Lf(p2 + J-Lf) +
+J-Lf(Af + J-Lf)(Pl + P2 + J-Lf )].
future surviving female offspring of a mutant female
in states 1, 2 and 3. Considering the probability of
transitions from state 1 to states 2 and 3, we obtain
\ cc cCfcC fCC
f CC _ AlPl rO 3 + PI 21 - CC CC·AlPlrO +Pl +J-Lf AlPlrO +Pl +J-Lf(11)
of transition
Biparental care is an ESS when both ffc < 1 and
mfc < 1.
The conditions for the other three pure profiles
to be an ESS can be derived analogously. Suppose
just females care for offspring. The mean number of
surviving male offspring of a male mutant is given by
- DC - C CCDC kCCAlql rmkDC(Am + J-Lm )
m l = - [DC CC C CC] .kDc(rm+I) Alql J-Lm +J-LmAm+J-LmJ-Lm
The mean number of surviving female offspring of a
female mutant is given by fpc = ADc/BDc, where
A Dc AlpfcrfckDc(Af + J-Lf)(p2 + J-Lf)
B DC kDc(rm + 1) [AlPfCrfCJ-Lf(p2 + J-Lf) +
+(Af + J-Lf)J-Lf(Pl + P2 + J-Lf )].
Female care is an ESS when both fpc < 1 and
mfc < 1.
Suppose just males care for offspring. The mean
number of surviving male offspring of a male mutant
is given by
CD AlqfDrmkCD(A~ + J-L~)
ml = kCD(rm+I)[AlqfDJ-L~+J-LmA~+J-LmJ-L~]·
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reproduction rate. However, there are a couple of
factors which cause the quantitative results to differ.
1. The model given here assumes that the num-
ber of surviving offspring depends on the
number of caring parents who survive the
period of care. The mortality of parents is
likely to discount the value of parental care.
It is expected that stronger conditions for
parental care will be necessary when the
mortality rate is relatively high.
2. Mortality removes individuals from each of
the states and offspring enter the adult pop-
ulation via the searching state (males) or
receptive state (females). This means that
at equilibrium there is a higher proportion
of individuals looking for mates. This effect
favours those deserting their offspring.
Comparing the results with the original model, as
expected from the argument given above greater gains
from parental care are required for uniparental or
biparental care to be stable. The increase required for
female care to occur is relatively small, while a greater
increase is required for male care to occur.
Figure 2 illustrates the set of ESSs given the gains
from parental care. It is assumed that kCD = kDc, i.e.
caring ability does not depend on sex. An approximate
log scale is used (in particular the diagonal boundaries
of the regions should be slightly curved), In(kb) is on
the y-axis and In(kf) is on the x-axis.
Table 1 illustrates the effect of mortality on the ESS.
Apart from the mortality rate, the parameters used are
the same as in the example considered above. It is
assumed that the mortality rate J.L is independent of
the strategy used. It can be seen that greater gains are
required for male care to evolve. Mortality does not
seem to pay a significant factor in deciding whether
female care should evolve. This seems to be due
to the following affects of the mortality rate on the
availability of prospective mates. As the mortality rate
rises, the proportion of females in the receptive state
rises due to the, by necessity, influx of young females.
The number is large in comparison to the relatively
small number of females in the receptive state. How-
ever, the large majority of males are in the searching
state. Although the faster influx of males will tend
to increase this proportion, males can also find mates
more easily due to the higher abundance of receptive
females. Hence, the proportion of searching males is
less affected by the mortality rate. Consideration of
the gains required for biparental care to evolve lead to
a similar conclusion.
Table 2 illustrates the effect of increased mortality
for all single parents. It is assumed that the mortality
rate is 0.01 for all other individuals and the remaining
parameters are as before. It seems that the conditions
required for biparental care to be stable are slightly
relaxed, whereas as expected the gains required for
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TABLE I
EFFECT OF MORTALITY - GREATEST VALUES OF kDC AND kCD
FOR WHICH NO PARENTAL CARE IS AN ESS AND MINIMAL
GAINS, kcc, FROM ADDITIONAL MALE CARE REQUIRED FOR
BIPARENTAL CARE TO BE AN ESS
J.-t kCD kDC kcc
0.01 5.0612 3.9360 13.6473kDC + 2.7695
0.02 5.2421 3.9332 14.3038kDC + 5.8815
0.03 5.4219 3.9305 14.8823kDC + 9.2894
0.04 5.6007 3.9277 15.3974kDC + 12.9580
0.05 5.7785 3.9250 15.8601kDC + 16.8601
uniparental care to be stable increase. It should be
noted that the sex ratio differs from one when just one
of the sexes care, since the caring sex will be affected
by a higher mortality rate.
TABLE II
EFFECT OF DIFFERENTIAL MORTALITY. SINGLE PARENTS HAVE
A HIGHER MORTALITY RATE - GREATEST VALUES OF kDC AND
kCD FOR WHICH NO PARENTAL CARE IS AN ESS AND MINIMAL
GAINS kcc FROM ADDITIONAL MALE CARE REQUIRED FOR
BIPARENTAL CARE TO BE AN ESS
J.-t~G' kCD kDC kcc
0.0105 5.2663 4.1318 13.5312kDC + 2.8855
0.011 5.4714 4.3275 13.4170kDC + 2.9997
0.012 5.8817 4.7190 13.1941kDC + 3.2223
0.013 6.2919 5.1104 12.9783kDC + 3.4384
0.015 7.1123 5.8934 12.5667kDC + 3.8500
Table 3 shows the effect of increased mortality for
all parents. The transition between no parental care and
uniparental care is the same as given in the previous
case, since this transition is unaffected by the mortality
rate of parents when both care. As expected greater
gains are required for biparental care to be stable.
TABLE III
EFFECT OF DIFFERENTIAL MORTALITY. ALL PARENTS HAVE A
HIGHER MORTALITY RATE - GREATEST VALUES OF kDC AND
kCD FOR WHICH NO PARENTAL CARE IS AN ESS AND MINIMAL
GAINS kcc FROM ADDITIONAL MALE CARE REQUIRED FOR
BIPARENTAL CARE TO BE AN ESS
J.-t: kCD kDC kcc
0.0105 5.2663 4.1318 14.3330kDC + 3.0540
0.011 5.4714 4.3275 15.0230kDC + 3.3535
0.012 5.8817 4.7190 16.4156kDC + 3.9974
0.013 6.2919 5.1104 17.8248kDC + 4.7021
0.015 7.1123 5.8934 20.6919kDC + 6.2976
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has considered a parental care game in
which the operational sex ratio is not only dependent
on the ratio between the number of adult males to the
number of adult females, but also on the actions of
all the members of a population and the physiological
differences between the sexes.
In(kee)
5 ,...-------r----------.,...--------""7"""""""--~ 51n(kD e)
CC
o
CC&NN
NN
NONE
NC
NC&CN
Fig. 2: Set of Pure ESSs according to the values of kDe and kee
It is argued that in the cases of mammals and birds
if uniparental care evolves, it is expected that females
will care for their young. It should be noted that in
these cases, males will often be able to choose to desert
before females can react. In this case, the interaction
between mates should be considered as an extended
game. A female will be able to gain by reacting to the
choice of a male and this will affect the set of ESSs.
Another simplification of the model is the assump-
tion that individuals only have two strategies available
to them, either care or desert. However, the basic
framework of the game can easily be extended to
consider a range of levels of parental care. Although
it would be difficult to find analytic results for such
a model, it would be relatively easy to simulate the
evolution of such systems.
When the gains from both uniparental care and
biparental care are moderate, there are no pure equi-
libria. It is expected in such cases that the population
will evolve to a mixed ESS, an evolutionarily stable
polymorphism (ESP) or some stable combination of
the two (for a definition of an ESP and a discussion
of the differences between a mixed ESS and ESP see
Ramsey [7]). In simple terms, at an ESP an individual
will always choose the same action (care or desert)
345
on entering the breeding state, but individuals of the
same sex take different actions. At a mixed ESS, on
entering the breeding state individuals of at least one
sex will choose to care with some probability p. Such
equilibria will be considered in a forthcoming paper.
Another simplification in the model lies in the
fact that there is no variation between individuals of
the same sex. It has been noted (see Szekely et al.
[12]) that there is a large degree of feedback between
patterns of mate choice and patterns of parental care.
It is hoped that these models will be developed to
introduce individuals of differing levels of quality and
thus introduce the aspect of mate choice into the
model. One thing that should be taken into account
is that in species with longer life spans pairs are often
very stable and will breed repeatedly, especially if
successful (see McNamara and Forslund [13]).
Although the model presented has many shortcom-
ings, it provides a general framework that can be
built upon to define more realistic, complex models
for which numerical results can be obtained. One
major problem may be the assumption of a continuous
breeding season. It seems difficult to get around this
problem using the approach considered here.
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